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I. Introduction 
At the heart of CJEU case C-630/17 Milivojevic 
v Raiffeisenbank St Stefan-Jagerberg-Wolfs-
berg eGen was the principle of free movement 
of services (Article 56 TFEU) and shared com-
petence in consumer protection law between the 
EU and Member States (Article 169 TFEU). In 
this case, the Croatian court referred a question 
concerned with Member States’ restrictions on 
free movement of services1 and whether the 
contract was a consumer contract for the pur-
pose of establishing international jurisdiction 
under the EU 1215/2012 the Brussels I Regula-
tion (Recast).2 The value of this case is in how 
far the CJEU affirms the relationship between 
the principle of free movement of services and 
Member States’ laws in such cases where the 
latter seeks to “invalidate”3 consumer credit 
agreements with non-authorised lenders. It also 
reiterated the interpretation of the consumer 
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concept for special international jurisdiction 
under the Brussels I Recast Regulation and the 
scope of exclusive, in rem-jurisdiction under 
the same instrument.  
II. Key Facts 
The case turned on the following facts. Ms Mil-
iovojevic, a Croatian national, entered into a 
credit agreement and mortgage with Raiffeisen-
bank, the defendant, a bank incorporated in 
Austria. A crucial aspect of the parties’ agree-
ment was that it was entered into in Croatia with 
the assistance of an intermediary. However, the 
defendant was not an authorised lender in Cro-
atia. Ms Miliovojevic sought a declaration of 
invalidity of both the credit agreement and no-
tarised deed relating to the creation of a mort-
gage to guarantee the debt. She also sought re-
moval of the mortgage from the Croatian Land 
Register. In support of her claim, Mrs Miliovo-
jevic sought to rely on Article 322(1) of the 
Croatian Law of Obligations which rendered 
null and void credit agreements featuring inter-
national elements entered into with a non-au-
thorised lender from another jurisdiction. Croa-
tian law also applied to consequential or ancil-
lary agreements to the credit agreement. Whilst 
the Croatian legislation came into effect after 
the agreement was entered into, it did have ret-
rospective effect. However, the agreement was 
entered into before Croatia acceded to the EU 
as a Member State. The central issue of the case 
was whether Croatian law was subject to the 
overarching principle of free movement and 
whether EU law applied over national law for 
the purposes of establishing international juris-
diction of the courts. 
III. The Four Legal Questions Aris-
ing 
Four interesting legal questions arose from the 
circumstances of this case. The focus of the first 
question was the applicability of Croatian law 
and its complementarity with the principle of 
free movement of services. Specifically, the 
first question was whether the free movement 
of services (Article 56 TFEU) and the free 
movement of capital (Article 73 TFEU) pre-
3 
 
vented Croatian law from applying in circum-
stances where the agreement between the par-
ties pre-dated the entering into force of the Cro-
atian Law of Obligations. The Croatian court 
also asked whether all sums were to be returned 
if the contract was held to be null and void. The 
Advocate General’s Opinion was focussed on 
the first question (see below). 
The second question dealt with the issue of in-
ternational jurisdiction. The focus was whether 
the Brussels I Recast Regulation precluded na-
tional law in determining where proceedings 
may be brought by a consumer against a non-
authorised lender.  
The third question was whether the contract 
was a consumer contract within the scope of the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation. Article 17(1)(a) 
of  that Regulation applies to matters relating to 
contracts between a private consumer and a 
business where the contract is, inter alia, for a 
loan repayable by instalments. Article 18 ena-
bles proceedings to be brought by the consumer 
against the other party to a contract either in the 
Member State where the EU defendant is dom-
iciled defendant or  the court of the consumer’s 
domicile.  
The fourth question was whether the scope of 
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24(1) of the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation applied to pro-
ceedings in Croatia in such cases where the 
mortgage secured over immoveable property 
was situated in Croatia.  
Linking all of these questions was the first ques-
tion, whether the retrospective application of 
Croatian law rendered the credit agreement null 
and void and, if so, whether Croatian law was 
contrary to free movement of services under 
Article 56 TFEU.  
Opinion of Advocate General 
The CJEU requested Advocate General 
Tanchev to consider the first question only. The 
key issue was whether EU law applied to Mem-
ber States in the situation where the date of the 
parties’ agreement pre-dated the accession of 
the new Member State. If EU law applied, the 
second key issue was whether free movement 
of services under Article 56 TFEU was unduly 
restricted by Croatian law. 
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Having outlined both Articles 56 and 63(1) 
TFEU, Advocate General Tanchev turned to 
setting out and reviewing Croatian law on the 
nullity of loan contracts with international fea-
tures, concluded in Croatia with an unauthor-
ised lender. Crucial to the issue of free move-
ment of services were Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Croatian Law of Obligations. A non-authorised 
lender is defined as a party whose “statutory 
seat is situated outside the Republic of Croatia 
at the date of the contract featuring international 
elements and which propose or supply credit 
services in the Republic of Croatia.” 4 Article 3 
defined credit agreements with international el-
ements concluded in Croatia between debtors 
and unauthorised lenders as null and void.5 
The Advocate General focussed on three as-
pects: First, the admissibility of the case, sec-
ond, determining the application of free move-
ment of services and, third, its application to the 
facts of the dispute.  
On the matter of admissibility, the Advocate 
General was brief and clear. Since the parties’ 
contract subsisted at the date of Croatia’s acces-
sion as a EU Member State (1 July 2013), EU 
law was applicable at the time of the com-
mencement of legal proceedings ( “ratione tem-
poris”6). The logical consequence of EU law 
applying meant that “legal relationships […] 
‘must adapt to the new legal framework’.”7 The 
Advocate General relied on a number of cases 
in support, most recently C-256/15 Nemek and 
C-122/96 Saldahna and MTS.8 The next aspect 
was whether the free movement of services (Ar-
ticle 56 TFEU) or free movement of capital (Ar-
ticle 63 TFEU) applied to the substance of the 
proceedings. The Advocate General’s starting 
point was the principle from C-549/15 E.ON 
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Biofor Sverige AB that Croatian law was subject 
to the relevant EU law. In E.ON Biofor, Di-
rective 2013/36 for the guarantee of cross-bor-
der credit services was seen as relevant. Recital 
15 of that Directive explains that it aims to se-
cure mutual recognition of authorisation and 
prudential supervision systems through the 
principle of the country of origin for such ser-
vices.9 Taking account of the purpose of the na-
tional legislation, Advocate General Tanchev 
took the view that granting credit was a service 
under Article 56 TFEU10 rather than the provi-
sion of capital. He provided three reasons for 
his viewpoint. First, the purpose of the Croatian 
legislation was the provision of credit.11 Sec-
ond, he relied on the Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Kokott in C-646/15 Trustees of the P Pa-
nayi Accumulation and Maintenance Settle-
ments. In that case, AG Kokott said that both 
services and capital are subject to the same prin-
ciple of proportionality and that restrictions on 
capital are a consequence of restrictions on ser-
vices.12 Third, the Advocate General also dealt 
with the argument that the defendant was not 
providing cross-border credit services. He 
found that the defendant did not contest that the 
parties had used an intermediary based in Cro-
atia to conclude the agreement.13  
The third aspect of the Opinion focussed on 
whether Croatian law amounted to a restriction 
of free movement of services against unauthor-
ised lenders situated outside Croatia.14 The Ad-
vocate General considered the various reasons 
put forward as to why the Croatian law was in-
troduced. At the hearing, the Croatian govern-
ment sought to explain that the legislation was 
designed to protect Croatian consumers against 
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unscrupulous creditors who sought to exploit fi-
nancial services in Croatia. However, the Ad-
vocate General did not accept that the re-
striction under Croatian law was justified on 
grounds of “public policy, public security, or 
public health.”15 Croatian law was held to 
“manifestly exceed the limits of what was re-
quired to achieve a legitimate goal…”.16 Refer-
encing the evidential requirement of propor-
tionality from C-390/12 Pflegrand Others, the 
Advocate General said that Croatia would have 
been required to clearly demonstrate that the 
legislation was proportionate by evidence of a 
“pressing problem [in Croatia, which required] 
extreme action.”17 In the absence of such evi-
dence, the Advocate General reached the con-
clusion that the Croatian legislation was not 
deemed proportionate and did amount to a re-
striction of the principle of free movement of 
services. 
IV. The CJEU’s Judgment 
The CJEU judgment addressed each of the four 
questions in turn. There is little controversy re-
garding the Court’s response to each question. 
First, the CJEU agreed with the Advocate Gen-
eral and ruled that Article 56 TFEU precluded 
national legislation which rendered invalid 
credit agreements entered into before the na-
tional legislation was enacted. On the relation-
ship between Article 56 TFEU and national 
law, the CJEU confirmed that the principle of 
free movement of services applied in the case18 
and took precedence over national law which 
sought to restrict free movement. The CJEU 
also held that Croatian law was not compatible 
with EU law19 and persisted when the same leg-
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islation was extended to agreements with cred-
itors established in Croatia.20 The CJEU ac-
cepted that the Croatian Government had not 
provided “evidence of a genuine, sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental 
interests of society”21 which may have merited 
the restriction contained in the Croatian Law of 
Obligations. 
The second and third questions can be consid-
ered here together. The CJEU dealt with the 
preliminary issue of admissibility of these ques-
tions succinctly. Since the matter concerned EU 
law, the CJEU was “in principle bound to give 
a ruling.”22 The core issue with the second 
question was whether proceedings under na-
tional law for the invalidity of credit agree-
ments featuring international elements”23 could 
depart from the general rule in the Brussels I 
Recast Regulation by “extend[ing] the scope of 
more protective jurisdiction rules […] to all 
debtors.”24 By contrast, the protective jurisdic-
tion under the Brussels I Recast Regulation ap-
plies as a “derogation” of the general rule in an 
“exhaustive list of cases.”25 Referring to its ear-
lier judgment in C-498/16 Schrems, the CJEU 
confirmed that the general principle of the de-
fendant’s domicile under the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation could not be derogated by national 
legislation.26 The CJEU confirmed that where 
the contract is a consumer contract, any juris-
diction agreement must comply with Article 
25(4) and Article 19 of the Brussels I Recast 
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Regulation.27 The effect of this enables the 
debtor a choice to bring proceedings against 
creditors either where the debtor or creditor has 
its domicile, regarded as its statutory seat, cen-
tral administration or principal place of busi-
ness (Article 63, Brussels I Recast Regulation). 
The CJEU also held that creditors can only 
bring proceedings where the debtor is domi-
ciled.  
Linked to the second question, the third ques-
tion focussed on the concept of the consumer. 
This concept of the consumer underpins the 
“philosophy”28 of Article 17. The CJEU has 
consistently given a restricted interpretation to 
the concept. The traditional concept, or “sta-
tus,”29 of the consumer has and remains appli-
cable only to those “private final consumers 
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contracting for their own private use or con-
sumption.” 30 There is a social justice, 31 equal-
ity 32 and economic 33 benefit to special juris-
diction since it enables the consumer – concep-
tualised as the contractually weaker party - to 
bring proceedings in the court where he or she 
is domiciled . This case continued the “objec-
tive” 34 means of ascertaining who is a con-
sumer to a “particular contract.” 35 To establish 
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jurisdiction under Article 17, the “content, na-
ture and purpose of the contract” 36 must be 
identified. Here, the court confirmed its recent 
decision in C-498/16 Schrems to the effect that 
a party could be both a consumer – and obtain 
the benefit of protective jurisdiction – and a 
professional entity.37 In the present case, the 
parties’ agreement had a “dual purpose”38 to fi-
nance the renovation of a private home to ena-
ble future rentals to third parties. For the pro-
tective jurisdiction to be applicable, the “link 
between the contract and the trade or profession 
concerned [must be so] slight as to be mar-
ginal”.39 In other words, the “essential” func-
tion of the contract had to be for private pur-
poses.40 Subject to the Croatian court’s final de-
termination, the CJEU held that the debtor was 
not a consumer for the purposes of Article 
17(1)(a) since the credit agreement was used to 
finance work on immoveable property intended 
for use as tourist accommodation and not en-
tirely for the consumer’s own private use or 
consumption.41  
The fourth and final question focussed on the 
scope of exclusive, in rem-jurisdiction under 
Article 24(1) of Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
This enables proceedings in rem to be raised 
where immoveable property is situated. The 
CJEU clarified two points. First,that the inter-
pretation of Article 24 must relate to its objec-
tives. These proceedings must relate to the “ex-
tent, content, ownership or possession of im-
moveable property or the existence of other 
rights in rem”.42 Furthermore, support for this 
view is seen in the Official Report to the earlier 
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1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Judgments (the Jenard Report). The Jenard Re-
port states that exclusive jurisdiction applied 
“only if [it] constitutes the principal subject-
matter of the proceedings of which the court is 
to be seised.”43 Since the action to remove se-
curity from a land registry was the principal 
subject-matter of the dispute between the par-
ties, it was this action that formed the basis of 
proceedings under Article 24. The CJEU held 
that Article 24 did not apply to a claim seeking 
the invalidity of a credit agreement. Given the 
explanation in the Jenard Report, this response 
was to be expected. The CJEU shone a light to 
the claimant with its second point. Referring to 
C-417/15 Schmidt, the Court ruled that whilst 
proceedings for invalidity of a consumer credit 
agreement were classified as proceedings in 
personam,44 jurisdiction over such proceedings 
could be deemed a related action under Article 
8(4) of Brussels I Recast Regulation. 45  
V. Conclusions  
The case serves as a useful reminder of compe-
tence shared between EU law and national law 
generally and in the field of cross-border con-
sumer protection. The value of this case is two-
fold. The first development from this case is 
that EU law applies to disputes brought before 
Member States even when the state did not have 
EU Membership at the time of the parties’ con-
tract which formed the subject-matter of the 
dispute. The CJEU affirmed the relationship be-
tween the principle of free movement of ser-
vices and Member States’ laws in such cases 
where the latter seeks to “invalidate”46 con-
sumer credit agreements with non-authorised 
                                                 
43
 Council Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, by Mr 
P. Jenard, (the Jenard Report) OJ C-59/1 [1979] at p .34. Word in 
brackets added for syntax. 
44
 Para 100 of Judgment, citing C-417/15 Schmidt. 
45
 Para 104 of Judgment. 
46
 Case Comment “Croatian law invalidating certain credit agree-
ments contrary to EU law,” EU Law Focus 2019 21-22. 
12 
 
lenders. Member States are not permitted to re-
strict free movement of services 47 through their 
national laws. This means that the principle of 
free movement of services retains its hierarchy 
over national measures. Where there is a clash 
between EU and national measures, compelling 
evidence must be presented to meet the require-
ment for proportionality of the national rules in 
such cases.  
 The second important development from this 
case is its affirmation of the scope of special ju-
risdiction for consumer contract for the purpose 
of establishing international jurisdiction under 
Brussels I Recast Regulation. Furthermore, the 
case confirms the strict scope of exclusive, in 
rem-jurisdiction under the same instrument. 
The case reiterates the restrictive interpretation 
of both in rem jurisdiction under Article 24 and 
special jurisdiction for consumer contracts un-
der Article 17. In particular, this case confirms 
that the concept of consumer under Article 17 
of Brussels I Recast Regulation remains re-
stricted to those contracts within its scope, in 
essence where the consumer is acquiring goods 
or services for their own private use or con-
sumption. In conclusion, lenders based in one 
Member States will be satisfied that national 
laws of target Member States cannot circum-
vent the principle of free movement. Consumer 
seeking services from  foreign lenders can be 
assured that when their  contract falls within the 
scope of Brussels I Recast Regulation, they  re-
main protected by international jurisdiction 
rules in that Regulation by rules which enable 
proceedings to be brought in the courts of their  
domicile. 
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